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Abstract
Vaccines are thought to be the best available solution for controlling the ongoing SARS-
CoV-2 pandemic. However, the emergence of vaccine-resistant strains may come 
too rapidly for current vaccine developments to alleviate the health, economic and 
social consequences of the pandemic. To quantify and characterize the risk of such 
a scenario, we created a SIR-derived model with initial stochastic dynamics of the 
vaccine-resistant strain to study the probability of its emergence and establishment. 
Using parameters realistically resembling SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we model a wave-
like pattern of the pandemic and consider the impact of the rate of vaccination and the 
strength of non-pharmaceutical intervention measures on the probability of emergence 
of a resistant strain. As expected, we found that a fast rate of vaccination decreases 
the probability of emergence of a resistant strain. Counterintuitively, when a relaxation 
of non-pharmaceutical interventions happened at a time when most individuals of the 
population have already been vaccinated the probability of emergence of a resistant strain 
was greatly increased. Consequently, we show that a period of transmission reduction 
close to the end of the vaccination campaign can substantially reduce the probability 
of resistant strain establishment. These results, therefore, suggest the convenience of 
maintaining non-pharmaceutical interventions and prevention protocols throughout the 
entire vaccination period.
Keywords: SARS-CoV-2 transmission, vaccination, vaccine-resistant strains, SIR model, 
stochastic dynamics.
JEL classification: C02, I18.
Resumen
Se considera que las vacunas son la mejor solución para controlar la actual pandemia 
por SARS-CoV-2. Sin embargo, la proliferación de cepas resistentes a las vacunas puede 
ser demasiado rápida para que su aplicación alivie la propagación de la pandemia, 
así como sus consecuencias económicas y sociales. Para cuantificar y caracterizar el 
riesgo de este escenario, utilizamos un modelo SIR con una dinámica estocástica para 
estudiar la probabilidad de aparición y transmisión de cepas resistentes a la vacuna. 
Usando parámetros que repliquen de manera realista la transmisión del SARS-CoV-2, 
modelizamos el patrón en forma de olas de la pandemia y consideramos el impacto que el 
ritmo de vacunación y la intensidad de las medidas de contención adoptadas tienen sobre 
la probabilidad de aparición de cepas resistentes a la vacuna. Como era de esperar, un 
ritmo rápido de vacunación disminuye la probabilidad de aparición de una cepa resistente 
a la vacuna. Sin embargo, aunque en principio pueda parecer contraintuitivo, cuando 
se produce una relajación de las restricciones en el momento en el que la mayoría de 
la población ya ha sido vacunada, la probabilidad de aparición de una cepa resistente 
a la vacuna aumenta considerablemente. En consecuencia, un período de contención 
estricta de la transmisión cerca del final de la campaña de vacunación puede reducir 
sustancialmente la probabilidad del establecimiento de cepas resistentes a la vacuna. 
Estos  resultados, por tanto, sugieren la conveniencia de mantener las medidas y los 
protocolos de prevención durante toda la duración de la campaña de vacunación.
Palabras clave: transmisión del SARS-CoV-2, vacunación, cepas resistentes a vacunas, 
modelo SIR, dinámica estocástica.
Códigos JEL: C02, I18.
Introduction
Vaccines are among the most effective public health measures against infectious disease1. Their
track record brings hope that SARS-CoV-2 may soon be under control2 as a consequence of a
plethora of vaccine development efforts3–8. A potential cause of concern is the low rate of vaccine
production and administration9 coupled with reports of new strains with higher transmission
rates10–12 and even with potential for some degree of vaccine resistance13–16. A number of models
considered the dynamics of the spread of a vaccine-resistant strain in the population17–20.
However, to our knowledge, the interplay of the population vaccination rate with the stochastic
dynamics of emergence of a resistant strain has been discussed21 , but not formally modeled.
Specifically, a concern is whether a combination of vaccination and transmission rates can create
positive selection pressure on the emergence and establishment of resistant strains22,23. To
address this issue, we implemented a model to simulate the probability of emergence of a
resistant strain as a function of vaccination rates and changes in the rate of virus transmission,
resembling those caused by non-pharmaceutical interventions and behavioural changes. We
then performed a number of simulations based on realistic parameters to study the likelihood and
pattern of the emergence of a resistant strain. Finally, we considered possible countermeasures
to reduce the probability of the establishment of the resistant strain in the population.
Results
We implemented a modification of a SIR model18,24 that included additional states to study the
interplay of the rate of vaccination, rate of transmission and the likelihood of emergence of
resistant strains (figure 1a). In addition to other states, individuals could be vaccinated (V),
infected by the resistant strain (Ir), or simultaneously be vaccinated and infected with the
resistant strain (IrV). The model was run to simulate a population of 10,000,000 individuals over
three years with the vaccination starting after the first year. In the model, the susceptible
individuals (S) are infected by the wildtype, or the original, strain at a rate of 𝛃𝛃 and infected
individuals recover at a rate of 𝛄𝛄 or die at a rate of 𝛅𝛅. At each time step, a fraction 𝛉𝛉 of all
non-infected individuals is vaccinated and with some fixed probability p, an infected individual
becomes infected with a resistant strain. Conversely, any individual infected with the resistant
strain can revert back to the wildtype strain population with the same probability, p. Immunity
acquired after infection decayed at a rate of 𝛍𝛍. Overall, our model included 8 character states
and 6 transition parameters between them (figure 1a, Table 1).
The rate of transmission in the course of a pandemic is typically cyclical25–27 due to government
interventions27,28, behavioural changes29–31, and environmental32,33 and other factors34,35.
Generally, the number of infected individuals is wave-like, guided by periods of high rate of
transmission, followed by periods of a low rate of transmission25,26,36,37. We thus varied 𝛃𝛃, the rate
of virus transmission to reflect this cyclical behavior (figure 1b,c). A high rate of transmission (𝛃𝛃h
= 0.18, equivalent to the effective reproduction number of Rh = 2.52) was alternated with a low
rate (𝛃𝛃l = 0.055 or Rl = 0.77), which broadly reflected the observed rates of transmission in
various countries affected by the SARS-CoV-19 pandemic with and without lockdown measures,
respectively37–39. The low rate of transmission was triggered in the model when the number of
individuals infected with any strain reached a high threshold Fh = (Iwt+Ir+IrV). We considered two
modes of transition from a low rate of transmission back to a high rate, when the number of
2
infected individuals reached a low threshold Fl at a constant value of Fl = (Iwt+Ir+IrV) = 1000, which
was used to generate the main figures, and at a relative value of Fl = Fh/8, which are available as
supplementary materials. The explored values of Fh and Fl were selected such that the number
of infection waves during the first year of the model roughly coincided with the number of waves
of SARS-CoV-2 infection observed in most countries during the first year of the pandemic.
SIR-like models frequently consider only deterministic dynamics18. However, the emergence of a
new strain is an inherently stochastic process under extensive influence of genetic drift40,41.
Therefore, we incorporated a stochastic stage into our model to allow for genetic drift in the early
phases of population dynamics of the resistant strains. The growth rate of the number of
individuals infected with the wildtype strain at time t was determined deterministically by (𝛃𝛃*S/N -
𝛄𝛄 - 𝛅𝛅)Iwt. By contrast, when the frequency of the resistant strain in the population is low, the
number of transmissions of the resistant strain was drawn from a Poisson distribution with a
mean of [42]. However, when the frequency of the resistant strain is greater than(β𝐼𝐼
𝑟𝑟
(𝑆𝑆 + 𝑉𝑉)/𝑁𝑁)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
1000 individuals (0.01% of the population), making it highly unlikely to disappear by stochastic
forces, the dynamics are treated deterministically in the same manner as the wildtype strain.
We define three stages of vaccine-resistant strain propagation, including emergence, the
appearance of the first individual with the infected strain, establishment, the time point when the
number of infected individuals reached 1000, and extinction, when the number of resistant strain
infected individuals returned to zero. The impact of three parameters on the resistant strain
propagation were explored: the probability of the emergence of the resistant strain (p), the speed
of vaccination (𝛉𝛉) and the initiation of periods of lower rate of transmission (Fh). All other
parameters were constants and their values were chosen to be broadly reflecting a realistic set of
parameters that approximate the available data for the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, 𝛍𝛍 =1/180, 𝛄𝛄 =
0.99*1/14 and 𝛅𝛅 = 0.01*1/14 (see Table 1).
Higher probability of the initial emergence of a resistant strain emerging in a single individual, p,
had a predictably43 positive effect on the probability of the establishment of the resistant strain
(figures S1-S3), but depended on the rate of vaccination (𝛉𝛉) and low transmission initiation (Fh)
in a complex manner (figure 2, figures S1-S3). The dependency was periodic and the
probability of establishment of the resistant strain was different by a factor of two even for some
similar values of 𝛉𝛉 and Fh (figure 2d,e).
The behaviour of the emergence, establishment and extinction of the resistant strain in the
population bears striking resemblance to the population genetics problem addressing the survival
of a beneficial allele in a growing population44,45. To understand the stochastic dynamics of the
resistant strain in the model, it is therefore instructive to consider the underlying mechanism in
population genetics terms. Unless the rate of mutation is zero, or infinitesimally low, new variants
will emerge in the population at a rate of p*Iwt. When the rates of transmission of the wildtype and
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where s is the selection advantage of the resistant strain40,46 and Rtr = (S+V)𝛃𝛃/N(𝛄𝛄 + 𝛅𝛅), or the rate
of population growth. Therefore, even when there is no selective advantage of the resistant strain
(s = 0) over the wildtype strain but the rate of transmission is high (Rtr > 1), the likelihood that a
new mutation is lost from the population is small (~10% for 𝛃𝛃h = 0.18, or R0 = 2.52). By contrast,
when the rate of transmission is low (Rtr < 1, which is the case during the low transmission
periods in the model), the probability of extinction of the resistant strain by genetic drift is
substantial40,41. The results of our model are consistent with theory40,41, such that the resistant
strain emerges during periods of high and low transmission rates, but goes extinct with higher
probability during periods of low transmission (figure 2f). Furthermore, under the parameters of
our model the resistant strain becomes established only when the rate of transmission is high
(figure 2f).
The complex influence of the speed of vaccination, 𝛉𝛉, and initiation of low transmission period,
Fh, on the dynamics of establishment of the resistant strain (figure 2d) is, therefore, likely driven
by the overlap of the vaccination period and the periodicity of the cycles of the number of infected
individuals driven by the interaction of Fh and 𝛉𝛉 (figure 1b,c). The coincidence of a high number
of vaccinated individuals and a high rate of transmission has two effects on the resistant strain.
First, as mentioned previously, because the rate of transmission is high, the emerging resistant
strain is not lost through genetic drift (see also44,47). Second, a high number of vaccinations
creates a selective advantage of the resistant strain over the wildtype strain23. The effective
reproductive number of the wildtype versus the resistant strains, Rtwt/Rtr, is (V+S)/S, which is the
selective advantage 1+s in eq. 1. Thus, when V is large the resistant strain has a growth
advantage over the wildtype strain, contributing to its establishment in the population towards the
end of the vaccination campaign. Taken together, the highest probability for establishment of the
resistant strain for a given p is reached when V, Iwt and 𝛃𝛃 (and the corresponding Rtr) are large
(figure 2c, eq. 1).
Indeed, when p = 10-6, in those cases when the resistant strain becomes established, its initial
time of emergence frequently occurs at around the time when 60% of the population is
vaccinated (figure 3). Therefore, we then tested the influence of a single intervention triggering
at a single extraordinary period of low transmission centred around 60% of vaccinated individuals
in the population (figure 3). We varied the duration of this intervention, T, ranging from one week
to 120 days and considered three rates of transmission, βl = 0.055 (R0 = 0.77), 0.03 (R0 = 0.42)
and 0.01 (R0 = 0.14). Both parameters decrease the probability of establishment of the resistant
strain with the length of the intervention having a relatively stronger effect (figure 3, figures
S1-S7).
Discussion
Our model suggests three specific risk factors that favour the emergence and establishment of a
vaccine-resistant strain that are intuitively obvious: high probability of initial emergence of the
resistant strain, high number of infected individuals48 and low rate of vaccination49. By contrast, a
counterintuitive result of our analysis is that the highest risk of resistant strain establishment
occurs when a large fraction of the population has already been vaccinated but the transmission
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(figure 2f).
The complex influence of the speed of vaccination, 𝛉𝛉, and initiation of low transmission period,
Fh, on the dynamics of establishment of the resistant strain (figure 2d) is, therefore, likely driven
by the overlap of the vaccination period and the periodicity of the cycles of the number of infected
individuals driven by the interaction of Fh and 𝛉𝛉 (figure 1b,c). The coincidence of a high number
of vaccinated individuals and a high rate of transmission has two effects on the resistant strain.
First, as mentioned previously, because the rate of transmission is high, the emerging resistant
strain is not lost through genetic drift (see also44,47). Second, a high number of vaccinations
creates a selective advantage of the resistant strain over the wildtype strain23. The effective
reproductive number of the wildtype versus the resistant strains, Rtwt/Rtr, is (V+S)/S, which is the
selective advantage 1+s in eq. 1. Thus, when V is large the resistant strain has a growth
advantage over the wildtype strain, contributing to its establishment in the population towards the
end of the vaccination campaign. Taken together, the highest probability for establishment of the
resistant strain for a given p is reached when V, Iwt and 𝛃𝛃 (and the corresponding Rtr) are large
(figure 2c, eq. 1).
Indeed, when p = 10-6, in those cases when the resistant strain becomes established, its initial
time of emergence frequently occurs at around the time when 60% of the population is
vaccinated (figure 3). Therefore, we then tested the influence of a single intervention triggering
at a single extraordinary period of low transmission centred around 60% of vaccinated individuals
in the population (figure 3). We varied the duration of this intervention, T, ranging from one week
to 120 days and considered three rates of transmission, βl = 0.055 (R0 = 0.77), 0.03 (R0 = 0.42)
and 0.01 (R0 = 0.14). Both parameters decrease the probability of establishment of the resistant
strain with the length of the intervention having a relatively stronger effect (figure 3, figures
S1-S7).
Discussion
Our model suggests three specific risk factors that favour the emergence and establishment of a
vaccine-resistant strain that are intuitively obvious: high probability of initial emergence of the
resistant strain, high number of infected individuals48 and low rate of vaccination49. By contrast, a
counterintuitive result of our analysis is that the highest risk of resistant strain establishment
occurs when a large fraction of the population has already been vaccinated but the transmission
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is not controlled. Similar conclusions have been reached in a SIR model of the ongoing
pandemic50 and a model of pathogen escape from host immunity51. Furthermore, empirical data
consistent with this result has been reported for influenza52. Indeed, it seems likely that when a
large fraction of the population is vaccinated, especially the high-risk fraction of the population
(aged individuals and those with specific underlying conditions) there will be a drive to return to
pre-pandemic guidelines53 and behaviours conducive to a high rate of virus transmission54,55.
However, the establishment of a resistant strain at that time may lead to serial rounds of resistant
strain evolution with vaccine development playing catch up in the evolutionary arms race against
novel strains.
Prior to discussion of the implications of our model we reflect on several properties of the
assumptions and implementation of our model. In classical SIR-like deterministic models even a
single individual infected with a vaccine resistant strain with reproduction number Rt > 1 will lead
to automatic establishment of the strain in the population. In an analytical solution, a SIR-like
model, even for Rt < 1 for the vaccine resistant strain, the number of infected individuals will tend
to 0 but only as time tends to infinity. In actual populations, a single individual infected with a
vaccine resistant strain still has a non-negligible chance not to infect anyone causing the variant
to go extinct due to random stochastic forces 41. Therefore, the implementation of stochastic
dynamics 56,57 of the vaccine resistant strain at low frequency in our model, considers the impact
of random drift on its dynamics, which lies at the heart of extinction of rare strains.
We considered the dynamics of a single vaccine resistant strain, however, there may be different
mutations that can lead to vaccine resistance. The emergence of different genotypes causing the
same phenotype is analogous to a distinction in population genetics between alleles identical by
state and by descent58. In our model, the treatment of independent emergence of different
mutations as a single entity does not influence the dynamics under the following two
assumptions. First, that different mutations lead to exactly the same phenotype, which is vaccine
resistance, and, second, that there is no recombination. However, the reported dynamics may be
quantitatively different if either of the two assumptions do not hold.
We have not explored the parameter ranges of 𝛃𝛃h, 𝛃𝛃l, the high and low rates of transmission,
respectively, and Fl the threshold between low and high rate of transmission. We selected the 𝛃𝛃h
and 𝛃𝛃l, to represent the known transmission values at the start of the pandemic37–39. However,
evolving strains are reported to have a higher rate of transmission 59 leading to higher 𝛃𝛃h and,
possibly, 𝛃𝛃l values than we used. An increase in the rate of transmission is not expected to
qualitatively influence the reported dynamics, but would shift the probability density of
establishment of a resistant strain (figure 3). Indeed, the peak probability at 60% vaccinated
individuals roughly corresponds to the point at which for the given 𝛃𝛃h, Rt, the average number of
transmissions for one infected individual, becomes less than 1. Because the reproduction
number for the vaccine resistant strain, Rt, is equal to (S+V)𝛃𝛃/N(𝛄𝛄 + 𝛅𝛅), the perk of the risk of
establishment of the vaccine resistant strain would increase proportional to an increase of 𝛃𝛃. An
increase in either Fh or Fl would lead to more individuals becoming infected and a proportionally
higher rate of emergence of the vaccine related strain, but would not change the qualitative
behaviour of the model. Furthermore, an increase of Fl would lead to reversion to a high
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and 𝛃𝛃l, to represent the known transmission values at the start of the pandemic37–39. However,
evolving strains are reported to have a higher rate of transmission 59 leading to higher 𝛃𝛃h and,
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qualitatively influence the reported dynamics, but would shift the probability density of
establishment of a resistant strain (figure 3). Indeed, the peak probability at 60% vaccinated
individuals roughly corresponds to the point at which for the given 𝛃𝛃h, Rt, the average number of
transmissions for one infected individual, becomes less than 1. Because the reproduction
number for the vaccine resistant strain, Rt, is equal to (S+V)𝛃𝛃/N(𝛄𝛄 + 𝛅𝛅), the perk of the risk of
establishment of the vaccine resistant strain would increase proportional to an increase of 𝛃𝛃. An
increase in either Fh or Fl would lead to more individuals becoming infected and a proportionally
higher rate of emergence of the vaccine related strain, but would not change the qualitative
behaviour of the model. Furthermore, an increase of Fl would lead to reversion to a high
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transmission rate with higher number of infected individuals, leading to shorter periods of low
transmission and decreased probability of extinction of the vaccine resistant strains.
The results of our model provide several qualitative implications for the strategy forward in the
months of vaccination. In our model, the probability of emergence of a resistant strain in one
individual per day was in the range of 10-5 to 10-8 for a population of 107 individuals. For the entire
human population of ~1010 that probability would be 10-8 to 10-11, which does not seem
improbably large. As of February 2021, ~109 individuals have been infected by SARS-CoV-2 [60]
with an average 14 days of sickness per individual61, so >1010 number of total days of infected
individuals. Furthermore, highly mutated strains may emerge as a result of long shedding in
immunocompromised individuals, a rare but realistic scenario62–64. Taken together, the
emergence of a partially or fully vaccine-resistant strain and its eventual establishment appears
inevitable. However, as vaccination needs to be ahead of the spread of such strains in similar
ways to influenza23, it is necessary to reduce the probability of establishment by a targeted effort
to reduce the virus transmission rate towards the end of the vaccination period before the current
vaccines become ineffective. Conversely, lack of non-pharmaceutical interventions at that time
can increase the probability of establishment of vaccine-resistant strains. For example, plans to
vaccinate individuals with a high risk of a fatal disease outcome followed by a drive to reach herd
immunity while in uncontrolled transmission among the rest of the population is likely to greatly
increase the probability that a resistant strain is established, annulling the initial vaccination
effort. Another potential risk factor may be the reversion of vaccinated individuals to
pre-pandemic behaviours that can drive the initial spread of the resistant strain.
One simple specific recommendation is to keep transmission low even when a large fraction of
the population has been vaccinated by implementing acute non-pharmaceutical interventions (i.e.
reinforced social distancing measures) for a reasonable period of time, to allow emergent
lineages of resistant strains to go extinct through stochastic genetic drift. The implementation of
non-pharmaceutical measures at a time of high vaccination can also help reduce infectivity when
the efficacy of vaccines is not perfect65. Additional factors that may make these measures even
more effective are: (i) increased and widespread testing, (ii) rigorous contact tracing, (iii) high
rate of viral sequencing of positive cases52,66 and (iv) travel restrictions. Finally, while our model
formally considers only one homogenous population, our data also suggest that delays in
vaccination in some countries relative to others will make the global emergence of a
vaccine-resistant strain more likely. Without global coordination, vaccine resistant strains may be
eliminated in some populations but could persist in others. Thus, a truly global vaccination effort
may be necessary to reduce the chances of a global spread of a resistant strain.
Materials and Methods
Our extension of the SIR Model features 8 distinct states. Susceptible, S, and recovered, R,
individuals are vaccinated over time to become vaccinated, V, or recovered vaccinated, RV,
respectively. Susceptible individuals can become infected with the wildtype, Iwt, or the resistant
virus strain, Ir. While the vaccinated population is immune to the wildtype, it can be infected by
the vaccine-resistant strain, in which case the state is represented by IrV. After a while any
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transmission rate with higher number of infected individuals, leading to shorter periods of low
transmission and decreased probability of extinction of the vaccine resistant strains.
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human population of ~1010 that probability would be 10-8 to 10-11, which does not seem
improbably large. As of February 2021, ~109 individuals have been infected by SARS-CoV-2 [60]
with an average 14 days of sickness per individual61, so >1010 number of total days of infected
individuals. Furthermore, highly mutated strains may emerge as a result of long shedding in
immunocompromised individuals, a rare but realistic scenario62–64. Taken together, the
emergence of a partially or fully vaccine-resistant strain and its eventual establishment appears
inevitable. However, as vaccination needs to be ahead of the spread of such strains in similar
ways to influenza23, it is necessary to reduce the probability of establishment by a targeted effort
to reduce the virus transmission rate towards the end of the vaccination period before the current
vaccines become ineffective. Conversely, lack of non-pharmaceutical interventions at that time
can increase the probability of establishment of vaccine-resistant strains. For example, plans to
vaccinate individuals with a high risk of a fatal disease outcome followed by a drive to reach herd
immunity while in uncontrolled transmission among the rest of the population is likely to greatly
increase the probability that a resistant strain is established, annulling the initial vaccination
effort. Another potential risk factor may be the reversion of vaccinated individuals to
pre-pandemic behaviours that can drive the initial spread of the resistant strain.
One simple specific recommendation is to keep transmission low even when a large fraction of
the population has been vaccinated by implementing acute non-pharmaceutical interventions (i.e.
reinforced social distancing measures) for a reasonable period of time, to allow emergent
lineages of resistant strains to go extinct through stochastic genetic drift. The implementation of
non-pharmaceutical measures at a time of high vaccination can also help reduce infectivity when
the efficacy of vaccines is not perfect65. Additional factors that may make these measures even
more effective are: (i) increased and widespread testing, (ii) rigorous contact tracing, (iii) high
rate of viral sequencing of positive cases52,66 and (iv) travel restrictions. Finally, while our model
formally considers only one homogenous population, our data also suggest that delays in
vaccination in some countries relative to others will make the global emergence of a
vaccine-resistant strain more likely. Without global coordination, vaccine resistant strains may be
eliminated in some populations but could persist in others. Thus, a truly global vaccination effort
may be necessary to reduce the chances of a global spread of a resistant strain.
Materials and Methods
Our extension of the SIR Model features 8 distinct states. Susceptible, S, and recovered, R,
individuals are vaccinated over time to become vaccinated, V, or recovered vaccinated, RV,
respectively. Susceptible individuals can become infected with the wildtype, Iwt, or the resistant
virus strain, Ir. While the vaccinated population is immune to the wildtype, it can be infected by
the vaccine-resistant strain, in which case the state is represented by IrV. After a while any
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infected individual recovers or dies, D. Finally, we assume that the recovered population retains
natural immunity towards both strains, but becomes susceptible again with some small rate, 𝞵𝞵. In
our model, immunity against the wildtype strain gained through vaccination is not lost during the
entire model period of 3 years, consistent with current estimates 67,68.
The total number of individuals, N, in the population remains constant at 10,000,000, which
includes the diseased individuals. We do not introduce new individuals into the population
because only a very small number of individuals die during the 3 years that we simulate.






𝑉𝑉 + 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑁𝑁
For all of the 8 states, for convenience we omit time index, e.g. we write, for example, S instead
of S(t). In the limit of large population sizes, the full dynamics without mutations can be described
by the following set of differential equations. In these equations, where t is time.?̇?𝑥 =  𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
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is not controlled. Similar conclusions have been reached in a SIR model of the ongoing
pandemic50 and a model of pathogen escape from host immunity51. Furthermore, empirical data
consistent with this result has been reported for influenza52. Indeed, it seems likely that when a
large fraction of the population is vaccinated, especially the high-risk fraction of the population
(aged individuals and those with specific underlying conditions) there will be a drive to return to
pre-pandemic guidelines53 and behaviours conducive to a high rate of virus transmission54,55.
However, the establishment of a resistant strain at that time may lead to serial rounds of resistant
strain evolution with vaccine development playing catch up in the evolutionary arms race against
novel strains.
Prior to discussion of the implications of our model we reflect on several properties of the
assumptions and implementation of our model. In classical SIR-like deterministic models even a
single individual infected with a vaccine resistant strain with reproduction number Rt > 1 will lead
to automatic establishment of the strain in the population. In an analytical solution, a SIR-like
model, even for Rt < 1 for the vaccine resistant strain, the number of infected individuals will tend
to 0 but only as time tends to infinity. In actual populations, a single individual infected with a
vaccine resistant strain still has a non-negligible chance not to infect anyone causing the variant
to go extinct due to random stochastic forces 41. Therefore, the implementation of stochastic
dynamics 56,57 of the vaccine resistant strain at low frequency in our model, considers the impact
of random drift on its dynamics, which lies at the heart of extinction of rare strains.
We considered the dynamics of a single vaccine resistant strain, however, there may be different
mutations that can lead to vaccine resistance. The emergence of different genotypes causing the
same phenotype is analogous to a distinction in population genetics between alleles identical by
state and by descent58. In our model, the treatment of independent emergence of different
mutations as a single entity does not influence the dynamics under the following two
assumptions. First, that different mutations lead to exactly the same phenotype, which is vaccine
resistance, and, second, that there is no recombination. However, the reported dynamics may be
quantitatively different if either of the two assumptions do not hold.
We have not explored the parameter ranges of 𝛃𝛃h, 𝛃𝛃l, the high and low rates of transmission,
respectively, and Fl the threshold between low and high rate of transmission. We selected the 𝛃𝛃h
and 𝛃𝛃l, to represent the known transmission values at the start of the pandemic37–39. However,
evolving strains are reported to have a higher rate of transmission 59 leading to higher 𝛃𝛃h and,
possibly, 𝛃𝛃l values than we used. An increase in the rate of transmission is not expected to
qualitatively influence the reported dynamics, but would shift the probability density of
establishment of a resistant strain (figure 3). Indeed, the peak probability at 60% vaccinated
individuals roughly corresponds to the point at which for the given 𝛃𝛃h, Rt, the average number of
transmissions for one infected individual, becomes less than 1. Because the reproduction
number for the vaccine resistant strain, Rt, is equal to (S+V)𝛃𝛃/N(𝛄𝛄 + 𝛅𝛅), the perk of the risk of
establishment of the vaccine resistant strain would increase proportional to an increase of 𝛃𝛃. An
increase in either Fh or Fl would lead to more individuals becoming infected and a proportionally
higher rate of emergence of the vaccine related strain, but would not change the qualitative
behaviour of the model. Furthermore, an increase of Fl would lead to reversion to a high
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transmission rate with higher number of infected individuals, leading to shorter periods of low
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can increase the probability of establishment of vaccine-resistant strains. For example, plans to
vaccinate individuals with a high risk of a fatal disease outcome followed by a drive to reach herd
immunity while in uncontrolled transmission among the rest of the population is likely to greatly
increase the probability that a resistant strain is established, annulling the initial vaccination
effort. Another potential risk factor may be the reversion of vaccinated individuals to
pre-pandemic behaviours that can drive the initial spread of the resistant strain.
One simple specific recommendation is to keep transmission low even when a large fraction of
the population has been vaccinated by implementing acute non-pharmaceutical interventions (i.e.
reinforced social distancing measures) for a reasonable period of time, to allow emergent
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non-pharmaceutical measures at a time of high vaccination can also help reduce infectivity when
the efficacy of vaccines is not perfect65. Additional factors that may make these measures even
more effective are: (i) increased and widespread testing, (ii) rigorous contact tracing, (iii) high
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formally considers only one homogenous population, our data also suggest that delays in
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eliminated in some populations but could persist in others. Thus, a truly global vaccination effort
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increase the probability that a resistant strain is established, annulling the initial vaccination
effort. Another potential risk factor may be the reversion of vaccinated individuals to
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the efficacy of vaccines is not perfect65. Additional factors that may make these measures even
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infected individual recovers or dies, D. Finally, we assume that the recovered population retains
natural immunity towards both strains, but becomes susceptible again with some small rate, 𝞵𝞵. In
our model, immunity against the wildtype strain gained through vaccination is not lost during the
entire model period of 3 years, consistent with current estimates 67,68.
The total number of individuals, N, in the population remains constant at 10,000,000, which
includes the diseased individuals. We do not introduce new individuals into the population
because only a very small number of individuals die during the 3 years that we simulate.
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infected individual recovers or dies, D. Finally, we assume that the recovered population retains
natural immunity towards both strains, but becomes susceptible again with some small rate, 𝞵𝞵. In
our model, immunity against the wildtype strain gained through vaccination is not lost during the
entire model period of 3 years, consistent with current estimates 67,68.
The total number of individuals, N, in the population remains constant at 10,000,000, which
includes the diseased individuals. We do not introduce new individuals into the population
because only a very small number of individuals die during the 3 years that we simulate.






𝑉𝑉 + 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑁𝑁
For all of the 8 states, for convenience we omit time index, e.g. we write, for example, S instead
of S(t). In the limit of large population sizes, the full dynamics without mutations can be described
by the following set of differential equations. In these equations, where t is time.?̇?𝑥 =  𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
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The dynamics are influenced by the following constant parameters: the recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, the
death rate, 𝛅𝛅, and the rate at which natural immunity is lost, 𝛍𝛍. Additionally we introduce a time
dependent transmission rate and a function , which controls the speed of vaccination.β(𝑡𝑡) θ(𝑡𝑡)
Time Dependent Transmission Rate
Pandemics often proceed in wave-like pattern25,26,36,37, so we introduce a parameter , whichβ(𝑡𝑡)
switches between high and low transmission rates. The model begins with a period of a high rate





infected with any strain, , reaches the value of Fh. Transition from a period of𝐼𝐼 = (𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟
𝑉𝑉)
low to high infection rate occurs at Fl = 1000 or Fl = Fh/8.
Vaccination
Vaccination is modelled as almost always a linear function with saturation. The deviation from
linearity occurs towards the end of the vaccination period. At that time, there may be fewer
individuals that can be vaccinated than the number of individuals vaccinated at any time point, or
. This state can persist for longer than one point in time because in our model𝑆𝑆 + 𝑅𝑅 − ℎ < θ
infected individuals are vaccinated only once they recover. h denotes the number of individuals in
the population that are never vaccinated. A maximum of N-h individuals can be vaccinated at the
end of the vaccination program. The constant k controls the saturation of the vaccination speed
once the number of susceptible individuals is significantly depleted. The state dependent
vaccination speed is given as:θ(𝑡𝑡)








where can take different values and h and k are chosen to be small (see Table 1).θ
0
Integration Method
The deterministic differential equations eq. 11 were numerically solved using an Euler Forward
Integration Scheme, with time step 𝚫𝚫t, measured in days.
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Integration Method
The deterministic differential equations eq. 11 were numerically solved using an Euler Forward
Integration Scheme, with time step 𝚫𝚫t, measured in days.
8Resistant Strain
Each day and for every individual infected with the wildtype strain, Iwt, there is a small probability
p, that a vaccine-resistant strain emerges in that individual. Then this individual switches from
state Iwt to state Ir. Conversely, any individual infected with the resistant strain, Ir can revert back
to the wildtype strain, Iwt, with the same probability p. Each time step the number of individuals
that transition between being infected with different strains is drawn from a Poisson distribution
with mean 𝚫𝚫tpIwt , for transition to the resistant strain, or 𝚫𝚫tpIr , for reversion to the wildtype strain.
The sum of Poisson distributed random variables is itself a Poisson distributed random variable
with the mean corresponding to the sum of the means.
Stochastic and Deterministic Regimes
The population dynamics of a rare variant is an inherently stochastic process40,41. We can
formally treat the spread of a disease in our model as a stochastic birth-death process. In the
following we illustrate this with the number of wildtype infections Iwt as an example. In each
infinitesimally small time step dt, there is a probability , that the wildtype population Iwtβ𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
grows by 1, Iw while the susceptible population is decreased, . Similarly,𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 → 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 1,  𝑆𝑆 → 𝑆𝑆 − 1
with probability Iwt is reduced by 1, , while the number of recovered(γ + δ)𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 → 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 − 1,  
or dead grows by 1. We carefully model small populations, , with representing a small𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
< 𝑁𝑁* 𝑁𝑁*
number of individuals, using a stochastic Tau-Leaping Algorithm69. We choose a fixed time step
size 𝛕𝛕, that is equal to the time step of the Euler Integrator 𝚫𝚫t. For very small Iwt Tau Leaping
Algorithm can produce a negative population69. This stems from the fact, that the number of
events K that occur in time 𝛕𝛕 is drawn from a Poisson Distribution, that always assigns a
non-zero probability for any . We reduce the chances of such a scenario, by solving the𝐾𝐾 > 𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
exact SSA Gillespie Algorithm when Iwt is below a critical size Nc 42.
For large Iwt , larger than some N*, this stochastic process can be approximated with the limiting
differential eq. 4 and an Euler Integration Scheme. Once , we consider that the resistant𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
≥ 𝑁𝑁*
strain of the virus is established in the population and we continue modelling it using the
deterministic equation18.
Parallel Evaluation Of Deterministic And Stochastic Variables
In our model we evaluate deterministic and the stochastic dynamics in parallel. While small
populations of infected individuals are treated as stochastic, other variables, such as the number
of susceptible individuals, S, are evaluated within the deterministic regime. While the infection
numbers of the wildtype or the emergent strain are in the stochastic regime (< N*), the
corresponding terms that contain the wildtype infections Iwt or the emergent infections Ir and IrV
are removed from the deterministic rate equations. When Iwt or Ir +IrV grow above the threshold
value N*, the corresponding population of infected individuals is treated as deterministic.
Sources of Errors
Finally, we discuss some sources of errors in our simulation: (1) Depending on the time step 𝚫𝚫t
the Euler Integration Scheme is not exact. In most of our simulations, we choose a time step of
9
one day, 𝚫𝚫t=1d. (2) Using the deterministic rate equations for the infection numbers in eq. 11 is
an approximation to the exact stochastic dynamics given by a birth-death model. The quality of
this approximation is given by the threshold value N*, which was 1000 in our model. (3) When Iwt
or Ir +IrV trespasses the threshold N* from above, the populations of infected individuals changes
from being treated as a real number (the mean field average) to being treated as a natural
number. We truncate the mean field average with a floor function and treat the remainder as part
of the recovered population. (4) The Tau Leaping algorithm is an approximation to the exact SSA
Gillespie Algorithm, that allows faster evaluation with a constant step size 𝛕𝛕. Increasing the
threshold value Nc increases the accuracy of the model (figure S12). (5) As discussed above, on
rare occasions a population of infected individuals drops below 0 in one leap. If this happens we
redraw from the same Poisson distribution. (6) Finally, while the time step of the deterministic
model 𝚫𝚫t and 𝛕𝛕 are chosen to be equal, for population sizes above Nc, the SSA algorithm acts on
exponentially distributed waiting times 𝛕𝛕SSA between reactions42. This introduces errors, if




In order to determine a range of acceptable values of Nc, we ran our simulation for a period of
T=200 days, initially loading the system with Iwt = 200 wildtype carriers. For multiple values of Nc
and no mutations, we compared the results of disease survival with the analytical solution
derived for the birth death process,
(eq. 13)𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡








We pick Nc=100 individuals, which gives us a reasonably small error.
Assumptions and Choice of Parameters
The model is run for a total time of three years, with vaccination starting one year into the model.
We assume that the wildtype and emergent strains have the same infectivity (𝛃𝛃 is the same for
both strains). We assume that infection by any one strain provides immunity to both, reflecting
that many vaccines carry only the Spike protein of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and it may be easier to
escape immunity provided by the vaccine than the immunity provided by infection. We also
assume that the immune response provided by the vaccine is more permanent and that immunity
provided by infection, is lost at rate 𝛍𝛍, on average after 0.5 years2,67,68,70 after recovery. Both of
these assumptions influence the model when the number of infected individuals becomes large,
which is unlikely for realistic average rates of transmission across the simulated time.
We assume that susceptible and recovered individuals have an equal chance to be vaccinated,
𝛉𝛉0. We also assume that the infection-recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, and infection-fatality rate, 𝛅𝛅 are the same
for the wildtype and mutated strains.
We regulate the rates of transmission exogenously in the model, with the rate of transmission (𝛃𝛃)
switching between a high rate, 𝛃𝛃h and a low rate, 𝛃𝛃l, when the total number of individuals infected
with either strain reaches a threshold parameter. These threshold parameters, Fh and Fl,
simultaneously reflect the impact of all non-pharmaceutical interventions and behavioural
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infected individual recovers or dies, D. Finally, we assume that the recovered population retains
natural immunity towards both strains, but becomes susceptible again with some small rate, 𝞵𝞵. In
our model, immunity against the wildtype strain gained through vaccination is not lost during the
entire model period of 3 years, consistent with current estimates 67,68.
The total number of individuals, N, in the population remains constant at 10,000,000, which
includes the diseased individuals. We do not introduce new individuals into the population
because only a very small number of individuals die during the 3 years that we simulate.






𝑉𝑉 + 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑉𝑉 = 𝑁𝑁
For all of the 8 states, for convenience we omit time index, e.g. we write, for example, S instead
of S(t). In the limit of large population sizes, the full dynamics without mutations can be described
by the following set of differential equations. In these equations, where t is time.?̇?𝑥 =  𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥/𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
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The dynamics are influenced by the following constant parameters: the recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, the
death rate, 𝛅𝛅, and the rate at which natural immunity is lost, 𝛍𝛍. Additionally we introduce a time
dependent transmission rate and a function , which controls the speed of vaccination.β(𝑡𝑡) θ(𝑡𝑡)
Time Dependent Transmission Rate
Pandemics often proceed in wave-like pattern25,26,36,37, so we introduce a parameter , whichβ(𝑡𝑡)
switches between high and low transmission rates. The model begins with a period of a high rate





infected with any strain, , reaches the value of Fh. Transition from a period of𝐼𝐼 = (𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟
𝑉𝑉)
low to high infection rate occurs at Fl = 1000 or Fl = Fh/8.
Vaccination
Vaccination is modelled as almost always a linear function with saturation. The deviation from
linearity occurs towards the end of the vaccination period. At that time, there may be fewer
individuals that can be vaccinated than the number of individuals vaccinated at any time point, or
. This state can persist for longer than one point in time because in our model𝑆𝑆 + 𝑅𝑅 − ℎ < θ
infected individuals are vaccinated only once they recover. h denotes the number of individuals in
the population that are never vaccinated. A maximum of N-h individuals can be vaccinated at the
end of the vaccination program. The constant k controls the saturation of the vaccination speed
once the number of susceptible individuals is significantly depleted. The state dependent
vaccination speed is given as:θ(𝑡𝑡)








where can take different values and h and k are chosen to be small (see Table 1).θ
0
Integration Method
The deterministic differential equations eq. 11 were numerically solved using an Euler Forward
Integration Scheme, with time step 𝚫𝚫t, measured in days.
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once the number of susceptible individuals is significantly depleted. The state dependent
vaccination speed is given as:θ(𝑡𝑡)








where can take different values and h and k are chosen to be small (see Table 1).θ
0
Integration Method
The deterministic differential equations eq. 11 were numerically solved using an Euler Forward
Integration Scheme, with time step 𝚫𝚫t, measured in days.
8Resistant Strain
Each day and for every individual infected with the wildtype strain, Iwt, there is a small probability
p, that a vaccine-resistant strain emerges in that individual. Then this individual switches from
state Iwt to state Ir. Conversely, any individual infected with the resistant strain, Ir can revert back
to the wildtype strain, Iwt, with the same probability p. Each time step the number of individuals
that transition between being infected with different strains is drawn from a Poisson distribution
with mean 𝚫𝚫tpIwt , for transition to the resistant strain, or 𝚫𝚫tpIr , for reversion to the wildtype strain.
The sum of Poisson distributed random variables is itself a Poisson distributed random variable
with the mean corresponding to the sum of the means.
Stochastic and Deterministic Regimes
The population dynamics of a rare variant is an inherently stochastic process40,41. We can
formally treat the spread of a disease in our model as a stochastic birth-death process. In the
following we illustrate this with the number of wildtype infections Iwt as an example. In each
infinitesimally small time step dt, there is a probability , that the wildtype population Iwtβ𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡
grows by 1, Iw while the susceptible population is decreased, . Similarly,𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 → 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 + 1,  𝑆𝑆 → 𝑆𝑆 − 1
with probability Iwt is reduced by 1, , while the number of recovered(γ + δ)𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡, 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 → 𝐼𝐼𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 − 1,  
or dead grows by 1. We carefully model small populations, , with representing a small𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
< 𝑁𝑁* 𝑁𝑁*
number of individuals, using a stochastic Tau-Leaping Algorithm69. We choose a fixed time step
size 𝛕𝛕, that is equal to the time step of the Euler Integrator 𝚫𝚫t. For very small Iwt Tau Leaping
Algorithm can produce a negative population69. This stems from the fact, that the number of
events K that occur in time 𝛕𝛕 is drawn from a Poisson Distribution, that always assigns a
non-zero probability for any . We reduce the chances of such a scenario, by solving the𝐾𝐾 > 𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
exact SSA Gillespie Algorithm when Iwt is below a critical size Nc 42.
For large Iwt , larger than some N*, this stochastic process can be approximated with the limiting
differential eq. 4 and an Euler Integration Scheme. Once , we consider that the resistant𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡
≥ 𝑁𝑁*
strain of the virus is established in the population and we continue modelling it using the
deterministic equation18.
Parallel Evaluation Of Deterministic And Stochastic Variables
In our model we evaluate deterministic and the stochastic dynamics in parallel. While small
populations of infected individuals are treated as stochastic, other variables, such as the number
of susceptible individuals, S, are evaluated within the deterministic regime. While the infection
numbers of the wildtype or the emergent strain are in the stochastic regime (< N*), the
corresponding terms that contain the wildtype infections Iwt or the emergent infections Ir and IrV
are removed from the deterministic rate equations. When Iwt or Ir +IrV grow above the threshold
value N*, the corresponding population of infected individuals is treated as deterministic.
Sources of Errors
Finally, we discuss some sources of errors in our simulation: (1) Depending on the time step 𝚫𝚫t
the Euler Integration Scheme is not exact. In most of our simulations, we choose a time step of
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one day, 𝚫𝚫t=1d. (2) Using the deterministic rate equations for the infection numbers in eq. 11 is
an approximation to the exact stochastic dynamics given by a birth-death model. The quality of
this approximation is given by the threshold value N*, which was 1000 in our model. (3) When Iwt
or Ir +IrV trespasses the threshold N* from above, the populations of infected individuals changes
from being treated as a real number (the mean field average) to being treated as a natural
number. We truncate the mean field average with a floor function and treat the remainder as part
of the recovered population. (4) The Tau Leaping algorithm is an approximation to the exact SSA
Gillespie Algorithm, that allows faster evaluation with a constant step size 𝛕𝛕. Increasing the
threshold value Nc increases the accuracy of the model (figure S12). (5) As discussed above, on
rare occasions a population of infected individuals drops below 0 in one leap. If this happens we
redraw from the same Poisson distribution. (6) Finally, while the time step of the deterministic
model 𝚫𝚫t and 𝛕𝛕 are chosen to be equal, for population sizes above Nc, the SSA algorithm acts on
exponentially distributed waiting times 𝛕𝛕SSA between reactions42. This introduces errors, if




In order to determine a range of acceptable values of Nc, we ran our simulation for a period of
T=200 days, initially loading the system with Iwt = 200 wildtype carriers. For multiple values of Nc
and no mutations, we compared the results of disease survival with the analytical solution
derived for the birth death process,
(eq. 13)𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡








We pick Nc=100 individuals, which gives us a reasonably small error.
Assumptions and Choice of Parameters
The model is run for a total time of three years, with vaccination starting one year into the model.
We assume that the wildtype and emergent strains have the same infectivity (𝛃𝛃 is the same for
both strains). We assume that infection by any one strain provides immunity to both, reflecting
that many vaccines carry only the Spike protein of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and it may be easier to
escape immunity provided by the vaccine than the immunity provided by infection. We also
assume that the immune response provided by the vaccine is more permanent and that immunity
provided by infection, is lost at rate 𝛍𝛍, on average after 0.5 years2,67,68,70 after recovery. Both of
these assumptions influence the model when the number of infected individuals becomes large,
which is unlikely for realistic average rates of transmission across the simulated time.
We assume that susceptible and recovered individuals have an equal chance to be vaccinated,
𝛉𝛉0. We also assume that the infection-recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, and infection-fatality rate, 𝛅𝛅 are the same
for the wildtype and mutated strains.
We regulate the rates of transmission exogenously in the model, with the rate of transmission (𝛃𝛃)
switching between a high rate, 𝛃𝛃h and a low rate, 𝛃𝛃l, when the total number of individuals infected
with either strain reaches a threshold parameter. These threshold parameters, Fh and Fl,
simultaneously reflect the impact of all non-pharmaceutical interventions and behavioural
10
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one day, 𝚫𝚫t=1d. (2) Using the deterministic rate equations for the infection numbers in eq. 11 is
an approximation to the exact stochastic dynamics given by a birth-death model. The quality of
this approximation is given by the threshold value N*, which was 1000 in our model. (3) When Iwt
or Ir +IrV trespasses the threshold N* from above, the populations of infected individuals changes
from being treated as a real number (the mean field average) to being treated as a natural
number. We truncate the mean field average with a floor function and treat the remainder as part
of the recovered population. (4) The Tau Leaping algorithm is an approximation to the exact SSA
Gillespie Algorithm, that allows faster evaluation with a constant step size 𝛕𝛕. Increasing the
threshold value Nc increases the accuracy of the model (figure S12). (5) As discussed above, on
rare occasions a population of infected individuals drops below 0 in one leap. If this happens we
redraw from the same Poisson distribution. (6) Finally, while the time step of the deterministic
model 𝚫𝚫t and 𝛕𝛕 are chosen to be equal, for population sizes above Nc, the SSA algorithm acts on
exponentially distributed waiting times 𝛕𝛕SSA between reactions42. This introduces errors, if
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that many vaccines carry only the Spike protein of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and it may be easier to
escape immunity provided by the vaccine than the immunity provided by infection. We also
assume that the immune response provided by the vaccine is more permanent and that immunity
provided by infection, is lost at rate 𝛍𝛍, on average after 0.5 years2,67,68,70 after recovery. Both of
these assumptions influence the model when the number of infected individuals becomes large,
which is unlikely for realistic average rates of transmission across the simulated time.
We assume that susceptible and recovered individuals have an equal chance to be vaccinated,
𝛉𝛉0. We also assume that the infection-recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, and infection-fatality rate, 𝛅𝛅 are the same
for the wildtype and mutated strains.
We regulate the rates of transmission exogenously in the model, with the rate of transmission (𝛃𝛃)
switching between a high rate, 𝛃𝛃h and a low rate, 𝛃𝛃l, when the total number of individuals infected
with either strain reaches a threshold parameter. These threshold parameters, Fh and Fl,
simultaneously reflect the impact of all non-pharmaceutical interventions and behavioural
10
changes of individuals. The ranges of these parameters were chosen to broadly reflect realistic
parameters of a pandemic, including rates of infection and several waves of high infection in the
first couple of years of the model.
We operate under the assumption that vaccine efficacy not only impacts disease manifestation
but also blocks transmission at the same rate, which is a reasonable assumption based on
previous vaccine performance but has not yet been demonstrated.
In Table 1 we present the choice of parameters for the model, the ones that were constant and
those that were varied, including their boundaries.
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one day, 𝚫𝚫t=1d. (2) Using the deterministic rate equations for the infection numbers in eq. 11 is
an approximation to the exact stochastic dynamics given by a birth-death model. The quality of
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or Ir +IrV trespasses the threshold N* from above, the populations of infected individuals changes
from being treated as a real number (the mean field average) to being treated as a natural
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of the recovered population. (4) The Tau Leaping algorithm is an approximation to the exact SSA
Gillespie Algorithm, that allows faster evaluation with a constant step size 𝛕𝛕. Increasing the
threshold value Nc increases the accuracy of the model (figure S12). (5) As discussed above, on
rare occasions a population of infected individuals drops below 0 in one leap. If this happens we
redraw from the same Poisson distribution. (6) Finally, while the time step of the deterministic
model 𝚫𝚫t and 𝛕𝛕 are chosen to be equal, for population sizes above Nc, the SSA algorithm acts on
exponentially distributed waiting times 𝛕𝛕SSA between reactions42. This introduces errors, if




In order to determine a range of acceptable values of Nc, we ran our simulation for a period of
T=200 days, initially loading the system with Iwt = 200 wildtype carriers. For multiple values of Nc
and no mutations, we compared the results of disease survival with the analytical solution
derived for the birth death process,
(eq. 13)𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼
𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡








We pick Nc=100 individuals, which gives us a reasonably small error.
Assumptions and Choice of Parameters
The model is run for a total time of three years, with vaccination starting one year into the model.
We assume that the wildtype and emergent strains have the same infectivity (𝛃𝛃 is the same for
both strains). We assume that infection by any one strain provides immunity to both, reflecting
that many vaccines carry only the Spike protein of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and it may be easier to
escape immunity provided by the vaccine than the immunity provided by infection. We also
assume that the immune response provided by the vaccine is more permanent and that immunity
provided by infection, is lost at rate 𝛍𝛍, on average after 0.5 years2,67,68,70 after recovery. Both of
these assumptions influence the model when the number of infected individuals becomes large,
which is unlikely for realistic average rates of transmission across the simulated time.
We assume that susceptible and recovered individuals have an equal chance to be vaccinated,
𝛉𝛉0. We also assume that the infection-recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄, and infection-fatality rate, 𝛅𝛅 are the same
for the wildtype and mutated strains.
We regulate the rates of transmission exogenously in the model, with the rate of transmission (𝛃𝛃)
switching between a high rate, 𝛃𝛃h and a low rate, 𝛃𝛃l, when the total number of individuals infected
with either strain reaches a threshold parameter. These threshold parameters, Fh and Fl,
simultaneously reflect the impact of all non-pharmaceutical interventions and behavioural
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Table 1. Model parameters
Parameter Value Comments
Fixed parameters
Population size, N 10,000,000 individuals
Cut-off for stochastic mode, N* 1,000
Cut-off for Gillespie algorithm, Nc 100
Recovery rate, 𝛄𝛄 0.99*1/14 Average disease duration is 14
days61
Death rate, 𝛅𝛅 0.01*1/14 Infection-fatality rate is 1%71–73
Loss of immunity rate, 𝛍𝛍 1/180 On average in 180 days74,75
Share of non-vaccinated, h 0.01 1% of population
Saturation parameter, k 0.01







Bound for initiation of low transmission,
Fh
2,000 to 20,000 individuals
Bound for initiation of high transmission,
Fl
1,000 or Fh/8 individuals
Probability of emergence of resistant
strain, p
1e-8 to 1e-5 Daily for every infected
Vaccination speed, 𝛉𝛉0 0.001 to 0.015 0.1% to 1.5% daily
18
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Figures and Figure Legends
Figure 1. The states, transition parameters and dynamics. a, States are shown in circles and
transition parameters in squares. The transition parameter, μ, is the rate at which individuals lose
natural immunity and p, is the probability that an individual infected with the wildtype strain
transmits a resistant strain, so it is not a deterministic parameter. Example dynamics of the
number of individuals infected with the wildtype (blue) and resistant strains (red) for p = 10-6, θ0 =
1/365 and Fh = 15000. The period of vaccination is highlighted (green). Under the same
parameters the resistant strain may emerge and go extinct, b, or become established, c.
19
Figure 2. Impact of the rate of vaccination, 𝛉𝛉, and the initiation of low rate of transmission,
Fh, on model dynamics. The cumulative death rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains,
c, the number of wildtype-strain infected individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the
population is vaccinated and d, the probability of resistant strain establishment, for p=10-6. e, The
probability of emergence of the resistant strain as a function of the probability of emergence, p
shown for the parameter ranges of θ and Fh in the corresponding red and blue boxes from figure
panel d. f, The average number of times of 8x106 simulation runs during which a resistant strain
emerges (black) or goes extinct (grey) during periods of low (βl) or high (βh) transmission for p =
10-6. g, A resistant strain was never observed to establish during periods of low transmission (βl)
for p = 10-6.
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Figure 3. Time of initial emergence of a resistant strain that has become established.
Probability density that the resistant strain emerges as a function of time since the start of the
simulation, t, rescaled by the time at which 60% of the individuals are vaccinated, tv60, averaged
across simulations with θ (0.001 through 0.015), Fh (2,000 through 20,000) and p = 10-6. Without
any extraordinary periods of low transmission (blue line) the peak of the likelihood of emergence
of a new strain is at t/tv60 = 1. The likelihood of emergence of a resistant strain can be reduced by
an extraordinary period of low transmission centered at t/tv60 = 1 with a stronger reduction when
such period is longer, T (colour-coded), or when the rate of transmission is more strongly
reduced a, βl = 0.055, b, βl = 0.03, c, βl = 0.01.
Supplementary Figures and Legends
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Figure S1 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-5. The cumulative death rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant
strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of
the population is vaccinated and d, the probability of resistant strain establishment. e-g,
Probability density that the resistant strain emerges as a function of time since the start of the
simulation, t, rescaled by the time at which 60% of the individuals are vaccinated, tv60, summed
across simulations with θ (0.001 through 0.015), Fh (2,000 through 20,000). The impact of the
extraordinary low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on the likelihood of emergence of the
resistant strain as a function of the duration of that period, T (colour-coded), and the intensity of
the reduction of transmission e, βl = 0.055, f, βl = 0.03, g, βl = 0.01.
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Figure S2 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-7. The cumulative death rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant
strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of
the population is vaccinated and d, the probability of resistant strain establishment. e-g,
Probability density that the resistant strain emerges as a function of time since the start of the
simulation, t, rescaled by the time at which 60% of the individuals are vaccinated, tv60, summed
across simulations with θ (0.001 through 0.015), Fh (2,000 through 20,000). The impact of the
extraordinary low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on the likelihood of emergence of the
resistant strain as a function of the duration of that period, T (colour-coded), and the intensity of
the reduction of transmission e, βl = 0.055, f, βl = 0.03, g, βl = 0.01.
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Figure S3 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-8. The cumulative death rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant
strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of
the population is vaccinated and d, the probability of resistant strain establishment. e-g,
Probability density that the resistant strain emerges as a function of time since the start of the
simulation, t, rescaled by the time at which 60% of the individuals are vaccinated, tv60, summed
across simulations with θ (0.001 through 0.015), Fh (2,000 through 20,000). The impact of the
extraordinary low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on the likelihood of emergence of the
resistant strain as a function of the duration of that period, T (colour-coded), and the intensity of
the reduction of transmission e, βl = 0.055, f, βl = 0.03, g, βl = 0.01.
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Figure S4 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-5. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S5 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-6. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S6 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-7. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S7 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-8. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S7 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-8. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S4 The probability of establishment of the resistant strain for p = 10-5. The influence
of low transmission period centered at t/tv60 = 1 on probability of establishment of the resistant
strain as a function of the duration of that period, T, and the intensity of the reduction of
transmission, β.
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Figure S8 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-5 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S9 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-6 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S10 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-7 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S10 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-7 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S11 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-8 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S11 Impact of the rate of vaccination and initiation of low rate of transmission on
model dynamics for p = 10-8 and exit from low transmission at Fl=Fh/8. The cumulative death
rate from the a, wildtype and b, resistant strains, c, the number of wildtype-strain infected
individuals at tv60, the point in time when 60% of the population is vaccinated and d, the
probability of resistant strain establishment.
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Figure S12. The fraction of surviving strains after T=200 days in 107 runs, first initialized with Iwt =
200 infected individuals. The red dashed line shows the expected fraction of surviving strains, as
computed with eq. 13. The stochastic algorithm becomes exact, if no Tau Leaping is employed
and instead the whole simulation is evaluated using the Gillespie SSA scheme.
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